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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF INCULPATORY STATEMENTS
IN WASHINGTON UNDER THE RULE FOR
DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST AFTER
WILLL4MSON V. UNITED STATES
Julianna Gortner
Abstract: Washington courts hold that where a statement by an unavailable declarant,
offered in the trial of a third party inculpated by the statement, is predominantly disserving to
the declarant's penal interest, the statement is admissible under the hearsay exception for
declarations against interest. Federal courts have split on the admissibility of such
declarations, with some courts holding that any non-disserving portions must be severed and
excluded. In Williamson v. United States, the United States Supreme Court narrowed the
scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) on declarations against interest and held that
only the individual portions of such statements that are against the declarant's interest are
admissible. This Comment considers the balance of the policy against admitting hearsay with
the need for reliable evidence, and examines the guidance offered by the advisory committee
note to 804(b)(3). This Comment additionally contemplates the practical applicability of both
the tWilliamson and Washington courts' approaches, and concludes that Washington courts
should retain their current interpretation of the rule for declarations against interest regarding
inculpatory statements.
Out-of-court confessions of criminal activity generally are
inadmissible as hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence' unless a
recognized exception to the hearsay rule applies.2 Hearsay is considered
untrustworthy because the declarant is not under oath or subject to cross-
examination and the trier of fact is not present at the time the statement is
made.3 Exceptions to the hearsay rule often apply where a statement is
thought to be trustworthy despite an absence of the traditional safeguards
surrounding in-court statements.
One such hearsay exception is applied to declarations against interest,
allowing a witness to testify to hearing another person's out-of-court
admission. Under this exception, testimony regarding the out-of-court
1. Fed. R. Evid. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress"); Fed.
R. Evid. 801(c) ("Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.").
2. Admissions by a party are exempted from hearsay treatment, and are admissible under Fed. R.
Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). The advisory committee's note to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) explains that out-of-
court admissions by a party meet the definition of hearsay, but are exempted for policy reasons, and
no further guarantee of their trustworthiness is required. Specifically, under an adversary system,
parties are estopped from claiming that their own statements should be excluded as hearsay, and are
considered to have adequate opportunity to explain or deny their own statements at trial.
3. See Introductory Note; The Hearsay Problem preceding the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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statement is admissible if the substance of the statement heard by the
witness is so far contrary to the pecuniary, proprietary, or penal interest
of the declarant that it is presumable that a reasonable person would not
have made the statement without believing it to be true.4 Out-of-court
statements against a declarant's penal interest that could subject the
declarant to criminal liability may incriminate the declarant alone, both
the declarant and another person, or may incriminate only the declarant
while exonerating another person.'
In Williamson v. United States,6 the confessions at issue incriminated
both the declarant and the defendant. The United States Supreme Court
held that federal courts must separate confessions intc their component
parts when applying the hearsay exception for declarations against
interest The Court determined that only remarks that individually are
against the declarant's interest are admissible; non-di.sserving remarks
must be excluded.'
Washington courts currently treat third-party declarations as a whole,
admitting them in their entirety if they are predominantly disserving.9
This Comment considers whether Washington courts should adopt the
decision and reasoning of Williamson, and argues that they should not.
Part I focuses on pre-Williamson federal and Washington judicial
interpretations of the hearsay exception for declarations against interest.
Part II examines the Williamson case and the divergent reasoning among
the Supreme Court justices on the issue of whether non-disserving
remarks are admissible as part of longer, disserving declarations, or must
be edited out. Part III argues that the Court's interpretalion in Williamson
was not required by Rule 804(b)(3) or its advisory committee note and
that the current approach of Washington courts is preferable to that of the
Supreme Court. Finally, part IV uses a hypothetical confession to
demonstrate the practical advantages of the Washington approach.
4. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
5. Confessions that incriminate a third party are called inculpatory declarations against interest,
while those that incriminate the declarant but exonerate another person are referred to as exculpatory
declarations against interest.
6. 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
7. Id. at 2435.
8. Id.
9. See 5B Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice § 403, at 268 (3d ed. 1939).
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I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE HEARSAY
EXCEPTION FOR INCULPATORY DECLARATIONS
AGAINST PENAL INTEREST
A. Federal Split
The federal rule for declarations against interest was enacted in 1975
and emerged from an exception under the common law." Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3) provides for the admission of a "statement" that is so
far contrary to the declarant's penal interest that a reasonable person in
the declarant's position, knowing of the potential for criminal liability,
would be unlikely to make the statement without believing it to be true.'
Judicial application of Rule 804(b)(3) generally involves a two-pronged
approach, requiring first that the declarant be unavailable as a witness, 2
and second, that the statement contain facts against the declarant's
interest. 3 Although inculpatory declarations that incriminate both the
declarant and a third party are not directly mentioned in the text,' 4 federal
courts generally have held that they nevertheless fall within the scope of
the rule.'5 The rule additionally requires corroborating circumstances to
10. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Under the common law, the exception was limited to statements
against the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, with courts mostly refusing to recognize
declarations against penal interest as falling within its scope. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S.
243 (1913) (holding that a third-party confession to murder is inadmissible in the trial of a defendant
charged with the murder). But see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (holding that
Mississippi's refusal to recognize declarations against penal interest violates due process where a
third party made a trustworthy confession exonerating the defendant). Professor Wigmore criticized
the exclusion of statements against penal interest from the scope of the common law rule. 5 John H.
Wigmore, Evidence § 1477 (James H. Chadboum rev., 1974).
11. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
12. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a).
13. Under Rule 804(b)(3), a statement is against "penal" interest if it "tends" to subject the
declarant to criminal liability; the statement need not be an outright confession. See United States v.
Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1978).
14. The text of the rule includes a corroboration requirement for exculpatory declarations but fails
to mention inculpatory declarations. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
15. See United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1098 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 834 (1982) ("Mhe rule clearly contemplates the admission, under appropriate circumstances,
of such inculpatory... statements.). The advisory committee note to Rule 804(b)(3) suggests that
the rule applies to certain inculpatory statements that were spoken without an apparent motive to lie.
The legislative history of the rule similarly suggests that inculpatory statements are within the scope
of the rule. A sentence in an early draft, which explicitly excluded inculpatory statements, was
deleted to avoid codification of a constitutional principle. This deletion has been interpreted to mean
that at least some inculpatory statements were contemplated as admissible. See Michael D.
Bergeisen, Comment, Federal Rule ofEvidence 804(b) (3) and Inculpatory Statements Against Penal
Interest, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1189, 1191 (1978). But see 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger,
Weinstein's Evidence: Commentary on Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and State
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guarantee the trustworthiness of exculpatory statements before they are
deemed admissible. 16 Although the text of the rule does not require
corroboration for inculpatory declarations, a number of courts have read
this requirement into the rule to satisfy Confrontation Clause
requirements that evidence offered against the accused be reliable. 7
Some federal courts have separated inculpatory declarations into
individual admissible and inadmissible segments, following the approach
advocated by Bernard S. Jefferson, who suggested that only those
remarks directly against the declarant's interest may be considered
reliable, while all non-disserving portions should be severed.' For
example, this approach was taken by the Second Circuit in United States
v. Williams.9 In Williams, the guilty pleas of witn~esses in a drug
conspiracy were deemed admissible as evidence against the defendants
only after all references to the defendants were severed and excluded.20
The redacted pleas were admissible only to prove the existence of a
conspiracy and not as evidence of the defendants' membership in the
conspiracy.'
Other federal courts, however, have rejected the notion that
confessions should be divided into individual remarks and have
examined confessions as a whole, admitting non-disserving remarks
collateral to disserving ones. This approach more closely approximates
suggestions made by Professor Wigmore, who asserted that as long as a
Courts 804(b)(3)[031, at 804-158 (J.M. McLaughlin ed. 1993) (asserting that the sentence was
dropped because it was not needed and inculpatory statements were meant ta be excluded); see also
James E. Beaver & Cheryl McCleary, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest: State v. Parris
Goes Too Far, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 25, 29 (1984) (urging the exclusion of all inculpatory
declarations against interest from the scope of the rule, based in part on the lagislative history, which
the authors asserted favors exclusion of inculpatory statements).
16. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The advisory committee note explains that this requirement is to be
applied to circumvent fabrication.
17. See, e.g., Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701 ("To bring Rule 804(b)(3) within the mandate for
reliability, we hold that the admissibility of inculpatory declarations against interest requires
corroborating circumstances that 'clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."). The
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. V1.
18. Bernard S. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 60 (1944). A more moderate approach is advocated by Dean McCormick. Charles
T. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 256, Et 552-53 (1954) (suggesting that clearly self-serving
portions should be excluded, while remarks that are neither disserving nor self-serving should be
admissible).
19. 927 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 911 (1991).
20. Id. at 98.
21. Id. at 99.
Vol. 70:859, 1995
Inculpatory Statements After Williamson
statement is made while the declarant is in a trustworthy state of mind,
related statements should be deemed similarly trustworthy and therefore
admissible.' In applying this method of considering statements as a
whole, the First Circuit, in United States v. Barrett,' admitted an entire
statement into evidence, including remarks collateral to those against
interest. The Barrett court noted that it did not read the rule as broadly as
did Professor Wignore, but it did embrace the idea that non-disserving
remarks which tended to "fortify" the disserving remarks should be
admitted.24 The court reasoned that it was not Congress's intent to restrict
the exception to the point of excluding collateral material which was
"sufficiently integral to the entire statement." Similarly, in United
States v. York,26 the Seventh Circuit rejected the possibility of excising
non-disserving remarks from the hearsay comments of a murder victim,
and admitted incriminating portions of her statement that were not
explicitly against her interest, but were related closely enough to such
remarks to indicate their trustworthiness.27
B. Washington State Courts Consistently Have Treated Inculpatory
Declarations as a Whole
Although many state codes of evidence are based on the Federal Rules
of Evidence, states are sovereignties, and as such are not bound by
federal interpretations of evidence rules. Even the application and
interpretation of generally uniform evidence rules may differ from state
to state. Interpretations of evidence rules by federal courts may be
persuasive and serve as guidance, 8 but the state courts still are free to
form independent interpretations of state evidence rules. For example,
the court in State v. Brown2 9 indicated its reluctance to adopt the federal
interpretation of Rule 609 relating to the admissibility of prior
22. Wigmore, supra note 10, § 1465, at 339.
23. 539 F.2d 244, 252-53 (1st Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 252.
25. Id. at 253.
26. 933 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 916 (1991).
27. Id. at 1361. See also United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Even if[a
remark] were wholly neutral... it could constitute a statement against interest within the meaning of
Rule 804(b)(3) since it was part and parcel of a larger conversation in which clearly self-
incriminating statements were made.").
28. See 5 Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice § 6, at 11 (3d ed. 1989).
29. 111 Wash. 2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988), superseded on reh'g, 113 Wash. 2d 520, 782 P.2d
1013 (1989).
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convictions, which it viewed as overly restrictive." In so doing, the court
emphasized that Washington courts were not bound to adopt the federal
interpretation of the rule."
The Washington rule for declarations against interest was enacted in
1979 and shares the same text and advisory committee note as its federal
counterpart.32  Washington courts, in accord with their federal
counterparts, require unavailability of the declarant as a witness, an
"against interest" element in the statement, and, like some federal
courts,33  corroboration for both inculpatory and exculpatory
declarations.34 While the federal courts have split on whether inculpatory
declarations should be edited to exclude non-disserving portions,
Washington courts have rejected the notion of dividing: declarations into
admissible and inadmissible portions and consistently have chosen to
consider out-of-court inculpatory declarations as a whole. In State v.
Parris,35 for example, the court examined the declarant's narrative as a
whole and noted that if a self-serving motive predominated, the entire
statement should be excluded.36 In State v. Valladares,37 the court cited
Parris and chose to admit the inculpatory comments of a drug informant
in their entirety.38 Washington courts have continued to apply this
standard in more recent cases as well, regularly examining the context
30. Id. at 151,761 P.2dat 603.
31. Id.
32. Wash. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Historically, Washington law, like federal law, did not include
declarations against penal interest in its interpretation of the rule for declarations against interest, so
the codification of the rule substantially broadened the scope of this hearsay exception. See Tegland,
supra note 9, § 405, at 273.
33. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., State v. Parris, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 148, 654 P.2d 77, 31 (1982) (finding that
inculpatory declarations are only admissible if accompanied by "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness"). Corroboration may consist of specific circumstances indicating a statement's
reliability, or may be found in other evidence of the defendant's guilt. See Robert H. Aronson, Law
of Evidence in Washington 804-24 (2d ed. 1993). Among the factors the courts consider to ensure
the reliability of a statement are whether the declarant had an apparent mtotive to lie, the general
character of the declarant, whether more than one person heard the statement, whether the statement
was made spontaneously, the timing of the declaration, and the relationship between the declarant
and witness. See State v. Huteheson, 62 Wash. App. 282, 292, 813 P.2d 1283, 1289 (1991), review
denied, 118 Wash. 2d 1020,827 P.2d 1012 (1992).
35. 30 Wash. App. 268, 633 P.2d 914 (1981), aft'd, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77 (1982).
36. Id. at 277 n.9, 633 P.2d at 920 n.9.
37. 31 Wash. App. 63, 639 P.2d 813 (1982), aff'd inpart, rev'd in par, 99 Wash. 2d 663, 664
P.2d 508 (1983).
38. Id. at 70, 639 P.2d at 816.
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and circumstances surrounding the declarations in order to guarantee
their reliability.
39
II. WILLIAMSON V. UNITED STATES
A. Case Facts
In Williamson, the petitioner had been convicted in federal district
court in Georgia of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute,
conspiring to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, and traveling
interstate to promote the distribution of cocaine.40 The defendant was
implicated by the out-of-court confessions of another person, Reginald
Harris. After stopping Harris on the highway, a police officer discovered
nineteen kilograms of cocaine in the trunk of his rental car.4 Following
Harris's arrest, and while Harris was in custody, a drug enforcement
agent interviewed Harris by telephone and in-person. During these
interviews, Harris revealed his participation in the drug activities and
also implicated Williamson as the owner of the cocaine, as well as an
unidentified third party, whose existence Harris later admitted he had
fabricated.42 Harris told the agent that he had received the drugs
belonging to Williamson and was supposed to deliver them to a
dumpster.43 After the agent arranged for a controlled delivery of the
drugs in order to arrest the third party Harris described, Harris changed
his story. He stated that there was no third person, that he was afraid of
Williamson, and that he had been transporting the drugs to Atlanta for
Williamson, whom he was following on the highway when he was pulled
over and arrested. 4 Harris refused to sign a written account of his
confessions and later refused to testify at Williamson's trial, invoking his
Fifth Amendment privilege.5
39. See, e.g., State v. Rice, 120 Wash. 2d 549, 844 P.2d 416 (1993) (excluding entire confession
in murder case made while declarant was in police custody and where circumstances surrounding
confession indicated a lack of reliability); State v. Whelchel, 115 Wash. 2d 708, 801 P.2d 948 (1990)
(excluding entire narrative in a murder case where surrounding circumstances suggested
unreliability).
40. Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2434 (1994).
41. Id. at 2433.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2433-34.
45. United States v. Williamson, 792 F. Supp. 805, 806 (M.D. Ga.), af'd, 981 F.2d 1262 (1lth
Cir. 1992), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
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B. Lower Court Rulings
Because Harris was unavailable to testify,46 the distlict court allowed
Harris's confessions to come into evidence through the testimony of the
drug agent as declarations against penal interest under Rule 804(b)(3).
47
The district court considered each confession as a whale and concluded
that because the declarant was unavailable and clearly implicated himself
in his confessions, and because corroborating circumstances indicated
the trustworthiness of his statements, his confessions were admissible
under the exception.48 Williamson appealed, asserting that the testimony
regarding Harris's out-of-court confessions did not fit within the hearsay
exception for declarations against interest.49 The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed Williamson's conviction."
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court held that only the clearly
disserving remarks within Harris's confessions should be admitted."
Although the Court agreed to remand the case for recoasideration of the
admissibility of Harris's confessions under Rule 804(b)(3), it was
divided on the issue of whether third-party, out-of-court confessions
should be separated into discrete remarks. The majority opinion, written
by Justice O'Connor, concluded that the rule requires an examination of
separate remarks within third-party confessions for individual disserving
elements.52 The Court indicated that parts of Harris's confessions clearly
would be admissible under this approach, but other portions, especially
46. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(a) for the situations in which a declarant is coasidered "unavailable to
testify." Rule 804(a)(1), for example, defines a declarant as unavailable if the declarant is exempted
from testifying on the ground of privilege concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement
47. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2434.
48. Id.
49. Id. Williamson additionally claimed that admission of the confessions violated his right to
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.
50. United States v. Williamson, 981 F.2d 1262 (1lth Cir. 1992), affg 192 F. Supp. 805 (M.D.
Ga.), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994). The Court of Appeals affirmed without issuing an opinion.
51. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2437. The Court explicitly avoided reaching Williamson's
constitutional argument and based its decision solely on the rule for declarations against interest. The
argument might be made, however, that Williamson has constitutional implications because of the
frequent attempts in prior case law to "square" the rule for declarations against interest with the
rights of defendants to confrontation and due process. See Karl B. Tegland, 77 Litigation Today 10
(July 1994). Washington courts' requirement that confessions admittd under the rule for
declarations against interest have particularized guarantees of trustworthiness ensures that evidence
admitted under this rule will be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of th.s hearsay exception and
will stand up to challenge on constitutional grounds. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
52. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2435.
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those incriminating Williamson, probably would be excluded. 3 Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion,m on the other hand, concluded that
confessions should be considered as a whole, subject to certain
limitations noted below.5
C. The Majority's Opinion Requiring the Exclusion ofAll Non-
Disserving Remarks from Third-Party Confessions
In concluding that the word "statement" in Rule 804(b)(3)56 should be
read narrowly, the majority enumerated some of the dangers associated
with admitting hearsay. The Court focused on hazards such as the
potential for lying, misperception of events, inadequate memory, and
misunderstanding by the listener. 7 Its decision to adopt the narrower
definition of "statement" also was broadly premised on the notion that to
lie effectively, people often mix truthful and untruthful remarks.58
Against this backdrop, the Court determined that the underlying principle
behind the rule, that people generally will not speak against their own
interest unless they believe what they are saying is true, cannot justify
admitting any non-disserving remarks.59 The Court specifically asserted
that any non-disserving remarks, even those not incriminating another
person, are suspect because there is no assumption of truthfulness for
statements that are not explicitly against one's interest.' The Court
concluded that this underlying principle, discernible from the rule's text,
required it to choose the narrower of two definitions of the word
"statement" in "Webster's Dictionary."61 The Court accepted the
definition of "statement" as "a single declaration or remark" and rejected
the definition "a report or narrative" as overly broad, implying that the
53. Id. at 2437. The Court suggested, for instance, that Harris's comment that he knew the
suitcase contained cocaine would be admissible because it was against his penal interest. The Court
acknowledged that its application of Rule 804(b)(3) to inculpatory confessions involved a fact-
intensive inquiry but gave little advice as to the specifics of its application.
54. Justice Kennedy was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.
55. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2445 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices Scalia and Ginsburg filed
separate concurring opinions as well.
56. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
57. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2434.





latter fails to comport with the notion upon which Rule 804(b)(3) is
based.62
The Court commented that Congress could have, but did not, make
contemporaneous non-disserving remarks admissible under the rule.63
Referring briefly to the rule's advisory committee note, it found the
language of the note unclear on the issue of collateral remarks. However,
the Court pointed out that the note's reference to Dean McCormick's
treatise indicates that self-serving parts of longer narratives should be
excluded.' In stating that the principle underlying the statutory text is
clear enough on the issue, however, the Court refused to decide how
much weight to give the advisory committee note.6" In the Court's
opinion, the principle behind the text of the rule outweighs whatever
guidance may be offered by the advisory committee note.
D. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence: Considering the Confession of a
Third Party as a Whole
In Williamson, although Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority's
judgment that the case should be remanded, his interpretation of Rule
804(b)(3) differed significantly regarding the treatment of out-of-court
confessions. Justice Kennedy concluded that contemporaneous non-
disserving remarks in close proximity to disserving remarks in a longer
narrative may be admissible under the rule for declarations against
interest if certain conditions are met.66 To reach this conclusion, Justice
Kennedy relied on the advisory committee note, the interpretation of the
exception at common law, and the potential evisceration of the rule's
impact if all non-disserving remarks were severed.
Justice Kennedy rejected Justice O'Connor's argument that the
principle expressed in the text of the rule clearly resolves the issue of
whether the word "statement" should mean a declaration as a whole, or
each separate remark within a declaration. He asserted hat this principle
does not answer this question, and that the Court should refer to the
advisory committee note for further guidance.67 Justice Kennedy found
62. Id. at 2434.
63. Id. at 2435.
64. Id. at 2436.
65. Id. The Court's discussion of the note was limited to citing its langutge and asserting that it
was unclear, and possibly contradictory on the admissibility of collateral remarks. The Court failed
to elaborate on these assertions.
66. Id. at 2445 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 2442.
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that according to the note at least some remarks collateral to those
against interest would be admissible as "related statements."68 He then
reasoned that even if the legislative intent to include collateral remarks
was not evident in the note, there was a presumption that Congress
intended the rules of evidence to be applied as they had been under the
common law. 9 Citing to several commentators, 70 Justice Kennedy
indicated that the tendency under the common law hearsay exception for
declarations against interest was to admit certain non-disserving remarks
that were connected with disserving ones.
71
Finally, Justice Kennedy asserted that the exclusion of collateral
remarks would result in the exclusion of most inculpatory statements,
because statements incriminating others rarely are directly against the
declarant's own interest.' According to Justice Kennedy, this would
eviscerate the exception for inculpatory declarations against penal
interest, a result Congress did not intend. 3
Although Justice Kennedy's interpretation of Rule 804(b)(3) allows
for the admission of collateral remarks, he stated that the advisory
committee note does not suggest that all collateral remarks should be
admissible. He noted that McCormick's treatise, explicitly cited to by the
note, advises severing clearly self-serving remarks from longer
admissible narratives.74 Justice Kennedy concluded his opinion,
therefore, by recommending that courts admit remarks collateral to those
against interest in a longer confession, subject to two limitations. First,
where a collateral remark is so self-serving that it is unreliable, it should
be excluded.' Second, where the circumstances surrounding the
statement indicate that the declarant had a motive to fabricate, such as the
existence of an opportunity to gain favor with authorities or shift blame
to others, the entire statement should be excluded as unreliable.76 Justice
68. Id. Justice Kennedy quoted the advisory committee's note to Rule 804(b)(3) which states:
"Ordinarily the third-party confession is thought of in terms of exculpating the accused, but this is by
no means always or necessarily the case: it may include statements implicating him, and under the
general theory of declarations against interest they would be admissible as related statements." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Justice Kennedy cited to Charles McCormick, Law of Evidence § 256 (1954); 5 John
Wigmore, Evidence § 1465 (3d ed. 1940); Bernard S. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 57 (1944).
71. Id. at 2442-43.
72. Id. at2443.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2444.




Kennedy agreed that the case should be remanded, but maintained that it
should be reconsidered according to this approach.
III. WASHINGTON SHOULD RETAIN ITS APPLICATION OF
RULE 804(B)(3) TO INCULPATORY DECLARATIONS AND
REJECT THE WILLAMSON COURT'S APPROACH
Washington courts historically have interpreted Rule 804(b)(3) in a
manner similar to the approach taken by Justice Kennedy in Williamson.
Consistent with Justice Kennedy's proposal, Washington interprets Rule
804(b)(3) to allow non-disserving remarks to be admitted if they are a
part of a longer narrative that is disserving as a whole.77 Close analysis of
Williamson points out the virtues of Justice Kennedy and Washington's
approach to Rule 804(b)(3). Because of the fair balance under this
approach between the policy against admitting hearsay and the need for
reliable evidence, Washington should retain its current application of
Rule 804(b)(3) to inculpatory declarations.
A. The Williamson Court Strikes an Improper Balance Between the
Concern with Admitting Hearsay and the Need for Reliable
Evidence
1. The Narrow Definition of "Statement" Proposed ly the Majority
Fails to Account Adequately for the Need for Relevant Evidence
The Williamson Court's interpretation of Rule 804(b)(3) over-
emphasizes the policy against admitting hearsay, and fails to
accommodate the critical need for meaningful evidence in criminal cases
when sufficient protection can be afforded in a more balanced way. The
Court reasoned that the principle behind the rule-that people generally
do not speak against their own interest without believiag that what they
are saying is true-requires a narrower definition of "statement" when
the admissibility of collateral remarks is at issue.78 The Court specifically
77. See Tegland, supra note 9, at n.15. Under the Washington interpretation of the rule, even self-
serving portions of a longer statement could be admitted if the statement was predominantly
disserving. Washington courts have implied, however, that they might exclude easily severable,
clearly self-serving remarks. See, e.g., State v. Valladares, 31 Wash. App. 63, 639 P.2d 813 (1982),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 99 Wash. 2d 663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983) -,admitting statement as
predominantly against interest, but noting that the admitted collateral portions were not truly self-
serving, leaving open the question of whether clearly self-serving portions would be admissible).
78. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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stated that Rule 804(b)(3) does not extend to individual remarks that
merely are collateral to those against interest.
79
However, accepting the principle that people generally are honest
when speaking against their own interest does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that non-disserving portions of a longer, generally disservinig
statement should be separated and excluded. In other words, the principle
behind the rule does not resolve the issue of how narrowly the word
"statement" should be read. Applying this principle, it is as logical to
accept that a statement is reliable because it is disserving as a whole as it
is to presume that only portions of a generally disserving statement are
reliable. In deciding how narrowly "statement" should be defined, the
principle underlying the rule should not be considered determinative and
should not affect the balancing of the interests of excluding hearsay and
admitting reliable evidence.
In arriving at its narrow reading of the word "statement," the Court
focused on the policy against admitting hearsay and particularly on the
suspicious nature of inculpatory declarations."0 This suspicion and the
Court's assumption that people mix falsehood with truth to lie
effectively,8' comports with the commentary of Bernard S. Jefferson,
who considered any non-disserving portions of a declarant's longer
narrative untrustworthy. 2 Professor Wigmore, on the other hand,
asserted that all remarks within a longer narrative presumably are
trustworthy because of the declarant's more generally disserving state of
mind. 3 Both of these views are assumptions about the nature of human
behavior and neither has been proven singularly correct. These
assumptions, therefore, should not displace a balancing between the
dangers of admitting hearsay and the need for reliable evidence.
The Williamson Court failed to consider the general policy behind
hearsay exceptions, that is, the need for reliable evidence, as a




82. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Professor Wigmore asserted that against-interest
elements in a longer statement indicated a trustworthy state of mind, which assured that the
statement was trustworthy throughout, even without the requirement of corroborating circumstances.
Wigmore's view has been considered by some courts as too broad, even where declarations are
considered as a whole. See United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976) (admitting remarks
collateral to those against interest in a longer statement but not accepting the "rather broad
formulation" of Professor Wigmore).
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"statement." 4 The broad policy behind the hearsay exceptions as a whole
is that admitting less than ideal evidence is better than admitting no
evidence at all." The ideal conditions of having witne;ses testify under
oath, in the presence of the trier of fact, and subject to cross-examination,
are not available for out-of-court declarations made by an unavailable
declarant. Justifications for hearsay exceptions define areas where
evidence, although not given under these ideal conditions, is considered
trustworthy enough to be admissible. Thus, under Rule 804(b)(3),
evidence is admissible because of the rule's underlying premise that
people generally will not make statements contrary to their own interest
without believing them to be true. While evidence admitted pursuant to a
particular hearsay exception justifiably must fall within a particular
category of targeted testimony, exceptions to the hearsay rule should be
interpreted in light of the policy behind hearsay exceptions as a whole.
The need for meaningful evidence, especially where non-hearsay
evidence is unavailable, should not be overlooked In deciding how
broadly to apply Rule 804(b)(3) to inculpatory declarations.86
2. Other Safeguards Adequately Protect Defendants from Unreliable
Hearsay
Particularly where other mechanisms protect defendants' rights, the
Williamson Court's bright-line rule unnecessarily excludes evidence.
Although courts view declarations incriminating or exonerating a third
84. Professor Wigmore explained that the reasons for admitting hearsay are "trustworthiness" and
"necessity." See Wigmore, supra note 22, §§ 1420-22.
85. Introductory Note; The Hearsay Problem, which precedes the Federal Rules of Evidence
states:
[W]hen the choice is between evidence which is less than best and no evidence at all, only clear
folly would dictate an across-the-board policy of doing without. The problem thus resolves itself
into effecting a sensible accommodation between these considerations and the desirability of
giving testimony under the ideal conditions.
See also Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) advisory committee note ("[Tiestimony given on the stand in person is
preferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the specified quality, is preferred over complete loss of the
evidence of the declarant.").
86. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (suggesting that competing public policy
considerations, such as the interest in effective law enforcement, may sometimes outweigh the
requirement of confrontation at trial). See also Jay L. Hack, Note, Declarations Against Penal
Interest: Standards of Admissibility Under an Emerging Majority Rule, 56 B.U. L. Rev. 148, 166
(1976) ("[E]xcluding all collateral statements can lead to the arbitrary rejection of valuable
evidence.").
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party with suspicion, 7 the Washington approach is sufficiently effective
in guaranteeing the admission of reliable statements only.8 When a
witness is unavailable, and cross-examination is thus impossible, a
special effort must be made to guarantee a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation. 9 Washington courts require corroboration for both
exculpatory and inculpatory declarations against interest. This
requirement safeguards defendants' rights under the Confrontation
Clause, despite the defendants' lack of opportunity to confront declarants
at trial and conduct cross-examination. The corroboration requirement
may be satisfied where circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement indicate its reliability. This requirement thus guarantees the
presence of adequate indicia of a statement's trustworthiness and serves
to protect defendants' rights.
If the Washington approach to Rule 804(b)(3) had been applied in
Williamson, Williamson likely would have received protection from
Harris's confessions equal to what he received under the Williamson
Court's approach. A Washington court would have examined Harris's
confessions for a predominantly disserving or non-disserving state of
mind, and would have focused on the circumstances surrounding the
statements for an indication of Harris's motives in confessing.91
Applying this approach to the Williamson facts, a court likely would
have found a predominantly non-disserving or self-serving motive
behind Harris's confessions and excluded them in their entirety.
87. See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) (noting that arrest statements of co-
defendants are viewed with greater suspicion than ordinary hearsay because of the motive to blame
others and exonerate oneself).
88. By analogy, several federal courts have held hearsay statements admissible under the
exception for business records, codified in Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), despite their suspicious nature from
having been prepared in anticipation of litigation. These records have been held admissible because
of sufficient indicia of reliability to guarantee the reports' trustworthiness. See, e.g., Lewis v. Baker,
526 F.2d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that accident reports were admissible, even though they
had been prepared with litigation in mind, because the routine filing of such reports, and the
existence of non-litigation purposes for which the reports were prepared, were adequate "earmarks
of reliability"); see also Yates v. Bair Transp., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 681, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(holding that medical reports in a personal injury suit were admissible, even though prepared for
litigation, because they were prepared by doctors hired by the defendant who would have no motive
to lie in favor of the plaintiff).
89. The Confrontation Clause does not invariably require that defendants have the opportunity for
confrontation at trial. The United States Supreme Court has found that a defendant's right to
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment may be satisfied where there are sufficient indicia of
reliability to protect the defendant from false statements. See Roberts, 448 U.S. 56; Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74 (1970).
90. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
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Specifically, the court likely would have noted that Harris had confessed
to the authorities while in custody and had trivialized his own role as one
of merely transporting the drugs, while attributing a more substantial role
to Williamson as the owner.92 In Williamson, on the other hand, the Court
indicated that parts of Harris's confessions would be admissible against
Williamson.93 Although segments of the confessions would be admissible
as declarations against interest under the Court's approach, it is unlikely
that any remarks would seriously implicate Williamson because any
individual portions not against Harris's interest would be excluded.94
Only if an individual remark implicated both Harris and Williamson
would a .remark incriminating Williamson be admissible under this
application of the rule.
B. Rejection of the Advisory Committee Note to Assisr Interpretation
of Rule 804(b) (3) Was Inappropriate Where the Rule Itself Provides
No Guidance
The Williamson Court briefly discussed the advisory committee's note
to Rule 804(b)(3) in order to dismiss Justice Kennedy's assertion that the
note compelled the Court to interpret the rule as allowing for the
admission of some collateral remarks.95 Finding that the note's language
was unclear and even contradictory regarding the admissibility of
collateral remarks, the Court concluded that it was not necessary to
decide how much weight to give the note because the principle expressed
in the statutory text provided sufficient direction.96 However, because the
principle behind the rule does not resolve the issue9 7 and the rule itself is
silent, the Court's rejection of the guidance offered in the note regarding
the admissibility of collateral remarks was unwarranted.
The Washington application of Rule 804(b)(3) to inculpatory
declarations is more reasonable than that of the Williamson Court when
92. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. See also Tegland, supra note 9, at 275-76
("Statements made in custody ... are particularly suspect... and seldom qualify as statements
against penal interest."); Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2437 (1994) (noting that
"[s]mall fish in a big conspiracy often get shorter sentences than people who are running the whole
show").
93. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
94. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2437. The Court noted that the portions of Harris's confessions that
incriminated Williamson did not also subject Harris to criminal liability.
95. Id. at 2435-36.
96. Id. at 2436.
97. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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considered in light of the guidance offered by the advisory committee.
The committee's note does not dictate how narrowly the word
"statement" should be defined. The note does suggest, however, that
some remarks incriminating the accused are sufficiently trustworthy to be
admissible, as determined by circumstances surrounding the declaration.
As Justice Kennedy pointed out in his concurrence, the advisory
committee note refers to statements within a third-party declaration that
implicate the accused and indicates that they are admissible as "related"
remarks.9" Because most individual remarks incriminating a third party
are collateral to remarks against the declarant's interest,99 the note
implies, through its acceptance of "related" remarks, that some collateral
remarks are admissible.
Although the note's mention of "related" remarks suggests that
remarks incriminating a third party, which often are collateral to remarks
against interest, may be admissible, the reference to Dean McCormick's
treatise slightly narrows the rule's application to such remarks."ce
McCormick's approach is to admit non-disserving remarks that are not
clearly self-serving and to sever portions that are so self-serving as to be
considered unreliable."01 In acknowledging the direction of both the text
of the note and the reference to McCormick, Justice Kennedy's
suggestions for admitting declarations as a whole, except for clearly self-
serving portions, 2 closely comport with the guidance offered by the
advisory committee. Similarly, the Washington application of Rule
804(b)(3) conforms to the note's direction and should be retained. 3
98. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2442 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that the advisory
committee's reference to "related" remarks "seems a forthright statement that collateral statements
are admissible" under the rule). See also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
99. The Williamson Court implied, for example, that the portions of Harris's confessions
incriminating Williamson were only collateral to the portions against Harris's interest. Williamson,
114 S. Ct. at 2437.
100. The advisory committee's note to Rule 804(b)(3) refers to Charles McCormick, Law of
Evidence § 256 (1954) for a discussion of the balancing of self-serving and disserving aspects of a
declaration.
101. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
103. Although Washington courts conceivably might admit clearly self-serving remarks within a
predominantly disserving statement, courts have implied that easily severable, truly self-serving
remarks might be excluded. See supra note 77.
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C. Williamson Strips Rule 804(b) (3) of Its Effect on tMe Admissibility
of Inculpatory Declarations
By requiring that any non-disserving remark be excluded from a
longer declaration, the Williamson Court limited the effect of Rule
804(b)(3) to the extent that it will no longer be effective in many cases
involving inculpatory declarations. 4 As previously noted, courts
generally understand that Congress intended inculpatory statements to
fall within the scope of the rule.1 5 Commentators have observed that
most remarks incriminating another person are not directly against the
declarant's own interest. 106 In most cases, remarks incriminating the
accused will be collateral to the remarks disserving to the declarant 7
and, under the majority's interpretation, these remarks would be
inadmissible.
The Court's interpretation thus deprives the rule of much of its ability
to reach evidence not already admissible under another hearsay
exception. Individual remarks against the declarant's own interest will
often be incriminating-and therefore useful as e-vidence against a
defendant-only where other evidence connects the declarant and the
defendant in a conspiracy or joint action. In a case with evidence of joint
action, however, the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule ... likely
would already apply. In Williamson, the Court listed instances where
remarks incriminating the accused still would be admissible as
declarations against interest, in order to refute Justice Kennedy's
assertion that its interpretation eviscerated the rule's effect."° In each of
the Court's examples, however, the accused would be incriminated only
if there was some other evidence of a conspiracy or joint action between
104. As Justice Kennedy noted, there are rare cases where a single remark can be against the
declarant's interest while incriminating another, such as where one admits to stealing property, and
the defendant is being prosecuted for receipt of that property. Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
243 1, 2443 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
105. See supra note 15.
106. See Andrew R. Keller, Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the
Confrontation Clause, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 159, 163 (1983); see also Bergeisen, supra note 15, at
1207.
107. See supra note 104.
108. Fed. P. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Co-conspirator statements, made "by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy," technically are comidered "not hearsay." Id.
Like admissions of a party, see supra note 2, co-conspirator statements are exempt from hearsay
treatment even though they meet the definition of hearsay.
109. Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2436-37 (1994).
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the accused and the declarant."' Under the Court's approach, the
application of Rule 804(b)(3) to declarations incriminating the accused is
limited to these narrow circumstances. If the rule is to have any force
regarding the admissibility of incriminating remarks beyond that already
existing in other rules,' the Court's interpretation should be rejected.
IV. THE PRACTICAL ADVANTAGE OF THE WASHINGTON
APPROACH OVER THAT OF THE WILLIAMSON COURT
The problem of stripping Rule 804(b)(3) of its effect regarding
inculpatory declarations as well as the potential practical difficulties of
applying the Williamson Court's interpretation of the rule are best
illustrated through the use of a hypothetical confession. In the following
hypothetical it should be assumed that the declarant's confession is being
sought as evidence against the declarant's boyfriend, John, in a trial for
his own participation in the crime. It should also be assumed that the
declarant, Jane Doe, has been found "unavailable" under Rule 804(a).
Statement of Jane Doe:
My boyfriend John was at my house and overheard my mom and
me fighting in the kitchen. John came in to intervene and my mom
got out of control. I went to my room to get a gun that I keep for
protection. When I returned, my mom had pushed John to the
ground and was standing over him with a butcher knife. I threw
him the gun and he ended up shooting her. When I realized she was
still conscious, I grabbed the gun and shot her again.
The approach of the Williamson Court to this scenario would require
the exclusion of all non-disserving remarks, including all comments
110. For example, Justice O'Connor described a situation where the phrase, "'I was robbing the
bank on Friday morning,"' would be admissible against a defendant as an inculpatory confession. It
is clearly against the declarant's penal interest, but only incriminates another person in the robbery if
other evidence establishes the other's connection to the crime. Id. at 2436. Justice O'Connor
acknowledged that her examples of accomplice statements also might be admissible under other
sections of Rules 801-804.aId at 2437.
111. The Washington interpretation of Rule 804(b)(3), under which declarations may be admitted
as a whole, is not an improper end around Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the rule relating to co-conspirator
statements. Evidence is admitted under the two rules on fundamentally different theories. Evidence
falling under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is considered "not hearsay," see supra note 108, and no additional
indicia of reliability are required. The rule only places policy-based limits on when parties will be
estopped from asserting that statements made by those with whom they have acted jointly, or in
conspiracy, are inadmissible as hearsay. Evidence falling under Rules 803 or 804, on the other hand,
is considered hearsay but is admissible based on circumstantial evidence indicating reliability.
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incriminating John, because none of the individual inculpatory remarks
in this example are also against the declarant's own penal interest.
Because only those remarks that incriminate Jane would be admissible
under Williamson, any references to John's participation presumably
would be excluded, even if they were not self-serving to Jane." 2 The
portions of Jane's confession admissible under Williamson's application
of Rule 804(b)(3) would consist of a series of phrases against Jane's own
interest, such as her actions to get the gun and her own participation in
the shooting. This approach would leave a string of remarks without
context, purely against Jane's interest, that would be useless against John
in his trial unless other evidence established a conspiracy or joint action
between Jane and John.
Under the current Washington approach, on the other hand, Jane's
confession would be examined as a whole, with consideration of the
circumstances surrounding the confession to determine whether adequate
indicia of reliability existed."1 For example, if Jane confessed while in
police custody, this would suggest inadmissibility because of suspicion
that the confession was made to shift blame frora Jane to John.
Washington courts also would likely find a motive to curry favor with
the authorities if evidence indicated that Jane was offered leniency for
cooperation. The spontaneity and timing of the confession would be
another factor considered. If Jane confessed shortly after the shooting
and was emotionally responding to the situation, her confession probably
would be considered more trustworthy; whereas, if she confessed after
turning herself in to the police a week after the incident, the confession
would be considered less reliable because of her opportnity to concoct a
false confession. Jane's role in the shooting-passing her boyfriend the
gun and firing the shot that resulted in her mother's death-reveals that
she was an active participant in the crime and suggests greater reliability
because she did not appear to attribute an inconsequential role to
herself."4 In Washington, the admissibility of the confession as a whole
would depend upon a balance of such factors.
112. In an explanation of the various approaches to the admissibility of collateral remarks, Justice
Kennedy noted that in the example, "'John end I robbed the bank, ...... John and"' is non-disserving.
The only admissible portion under the Williamson Court's approach would be, "I robbed the bank."
See Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2441 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Charles McCormick, Law of
Evidence § 256, at 552-53 (1954)).
113. In an examination of a confession for particularized guarantees of tristworthiness, the courts
would refer to several factors. See supra note 34.
114. See supra note 92.
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1. The Potential Evisceration of Rule 804(b) (3) with Regard to
Inculpatory Remarks Under Williamson
The Supreme Court's approach in Williamson, as applied to third-
party inculpatory declarations, seriously undermines the rule's ability to
reach reliable evidence against a defendant incriminated by another's
declaration. The Williamson Court required the exclusion of individual
remarks incriminating a third-party defendant unless they also were
disserving to the declarant's own interest. When taken separately, the
individual remarks within Jane's confession that incriminate her do not
also implicate John. It is likely that none of the portions of Jane's
confession admissible under the Williamson approach would serve as
meaningful evidence against John, because all references to John's
participation in the crime presumably would be edited out. In the event
that other evidence established that the declarant and her boyfriend had
conspired, or acted jointly, to kill her mother, the remaining, edited
version of Jane's confession would be useful, but presumably could be
admitted under the co-conspirator exception alone.'
2. The Practical Difficulties in Determining the Admissibility of
Inculpatory Declarations Are Greater Under the Williamson
Approach
Although admitting third-party declarations under Rule 804(b)(3)
requires a fact-intensive examination of the circumstances surrounding
the declarations under either Williamson or Washington's approach, the
Williamson Court's requirement of severing all non-disserving remarks
from a third-party declaration is subject to greater practical
complications. The approach taken by Washington courts calls for
judging, from the circumstances, whether the predominant purpose
behind the declaration as a whole was self-serving or disserving.
Although this approach may be difficult for the courts," 6 the Washington
method has an advantage in speed and efficiency over the Williamson
approach, which requires the time-consuming task of evaluating whether
each individual remark within a declaration is disserving or non-
disserving. Even though it is more easily applied, the Washington rule,
which requires corroboration for both exculpatory and inculpatory
115. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
116. See Tegland, supra note 9, at 269-70 (noting that Washington's test based on a statement's
predominant purpose may require some assumptions about facts, but seems preferable to other
approaches).
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declarations and an examination of the context surrounding the
declaration, does not sacrifice reliability and adequately guarantees the
protection of defendants' Sixth Amendment rights."
7
In addition, courts applying the Williamson rule to Rule 804(b)(3)
may confront difficulties in making determinations of whether each
portion of a longer confession contains a disserving element. While it is
unclear from Williamson whether individual words must be scrutinized
separately, the suggestion is that in some cases, individual words, such as
a reference to the defendant, will be severed from a single phrase." 8
Although there may be some differences among courts. as to how much
to divide declarations into individual portions, Wiiliamson fails to
provide any clear guidance.
Furthermore, in excluding all non-disserving portions of a longer
declaration, these courts risk the possibility of ending up admitting only
a chain of remarks without context. Non-disserving remarks may serve to
hold a declaration together logically, and severing these remarks may
destroy its coherence. In the hypothetical, severing non-disserving
portions of Jane's confession would not only leave no useful evidence
against John, unless other evidence suggested joint action between Jane
and John, but also would leave a string of comments that would leave the
incorrect impression that Jane acted alone. For instance, the court might
consider the admissible portion of Jane's confession to be: "I went to my
room to get a gun .... I threw... the gun .... When I realized she was
still conscious, I grabbed the gun and shot her again." Severing collateral
remarks that give the confession context and provide insight into the
declarant's frame of mind may leave the confession ungrounded, or
worse, may give the trier of fact an incorrect impression regarding the
facts of the case." 9
V. CONCLUSION
In Williamson v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
significantly narrowed the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).
As applied in Williamson, the rule provides for the admissibility of only
those individual remarks within a longer confession that are clearly
117. See discussion supra part Il.A.2.
118. See supra note 112.
119. See 4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evide'ce § 501, at 832 (2d ed.
1994) (noting that the rule for declarations against interest might apply to collateral remarks where
there is a "close logical connection" with a remark against interest and wherm. "omitting the reference
would leave the statement vague and ungrounded").
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against the declarant's interest. Neither the rule itself, nor the principle
underlying the text of the rule, however, compel this interpretation. In its
application of the rule for declarations against interest, the Court failed to
adequately consider the direction of the rule's advisory committee note
and improperly balanced the concern with admitting hearsay against the
need for reliable evidence.
As currently applied in Washington, Rule 804(b)(3), which is identical
to the federal rule, allows for the admissibility of inculpatory
declarations as a whole as long as the declaration is predominantly
against the declarant's interest. This is a more practical application of the
rule than that in Williamson because it does not require the court to
analyze every remark for an "against-interest" element and it preserves
the context of such declarations. Moreover, if Washington chooses to
follow the Supreme Court in its interpretation of Rule 804(b)(3) in
Williamson, the rule will be rendered virtually ineffective with regard to
inculpatory declarations, which is contrary to the apparent legislative
intent to include such statements within the scope of the rule. Although
declarations by an unavailable declarant implicating a third party in a
crime are by nature suspicious, Washington courts employ adequate
safeguards in their application of Rule 804(b)(3) to such declarations.
The approach taken by Washington courts sufficiently guarantees the
trustworthiness of admitted declarations for purposes of the hearsay
exception for declarations against interest and also, if challenged, would
pass constitutional muster. Consequently, it is advisable for Washington
to retain its application of Rule 804(b)(3) to inculpatory declarations and
to reject the Supreme Court's approach in Williamson.

